Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: I was woken on a Tuesday evening in 2001, sometime after 11 pm. It was my neighbour David, a retired Navy Officer: “Craig, America’s under attack!” With images of Cold War ICBMs in flight, I asked what he meant. “They are being attacked. Turn on your television.” The urgency in David’s voice cut through our sleep haze.

In the chill of that Canberra night, my wife and I turned on the TV to see the footage of smoke plumes coming from the Twin Towers in Manhattan that shocked the world.

Five years earlier our family had stood on the observation deck of the South Tower during my posting to the USA on specialist training for the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Capability Development Group.

That fateful 9/11 night, we watched in disbelief as the news broke of the explosion at the Pentagon. When we saw the South Tower collapse live on TV, I realised I needed to do something as part of a response to this, and got ready for a very early start at work.

At the time I was a Lieutenant Colonel managing the Land Capability Development Program schedule and budget in the ADF HQ’s Capability Development Group. A few years earlier, while posted to this group after my specialist training in the US, I had initiated the Incident Response Capability Project. This culminated in the creation of the Joint Incident Response Unit (JIRU) [i] for the Sydney 2000 Olympics.

The Unit was developed to help prevent and respond to the mass casualty terrorist attacks that had been a feature of the ‘90s, notably the US Embassy attacks in Africa and the awful sarin attack in Tokyo’s subway.

The JIRU was designed to work with civil emergency agencies, as well as support the ADF’s Counter Terrorism Tactical Assault Group. After the Olympic Games, the JIRU’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological Response (CBRR) Squadron was retained. This meant a nucleus of specialist command, high-risk search, explosive ordnance disposal, and medical and decontamination specialist teams, had been preserved.

That 9/11 evening I was sure that something like the JIRU would again be needed to deal with any threats associated with what had just happened; either here in Australia, or supporting Australia’s interests offshore. Therefore, within about 12 hours of the attacks, I began to develop a concept around this nucleus for an expanded unit with greater capability.

Action – my first brief

Later that day, 12 September, I submitted my first brief. It was followed by a flurry of written and verbal briefs. I was then relieved of my routine duties and asked to focus on developing the concept. Senior leadership in both Defence and Army HQ were very supportive of developing, or redeveloping, this new, non-traditional Land Forces capability.

Meanwhile, Special Forces colleagues in the Land Capability Group were busy developing the concept for a second Tactical Assault Group. We would regularly coordinate our plans, as my developing specialist engineer capability would need to be capable of supporting theirs.

On 30 October 2001, the then Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Peter Cosgrove, signed off my selection as the Commanding Officer of this new unit. And in early November I joined the Army’s CBRR and Emergency Response Squadrons with my small new Unit of 10 staff at Holsworthy Barracks. Over the next few months, we supported CHOGM and were on call to support Defence counter-terrorism preparedness plans and participate in associated exercises.

More to do and an unexpected development

Most importantly we needed to develop and complete the business case as it still needed approval as an ongoing unit, or funding as part of the Defence Program. Once the business case was done, I briefed the then Defence Minister’s Chief of Staff [ii] ahead of the Cabinet Estimates Committee meeting. Given the nuances and interdependencies of the proposal, he invited me to accompany him as an adviser to the meeting. Unexpectedly, I found myself in the cabinet room with the committee, chaired by the then Treasurer, Peter Costello.

As the Incident Response Capability was tabled, I prepared to advise the Chief of Staff from the stalls.

Instead, I was invited to sit at the table, and Senator Helen Coonan graciously gave her seat so I could brief the Cabinet. This, I was not expecting! However, as I knew more about this subject than anyone, I was treated with courtesy by the chair and cabinet members, even when my costs were challenged by the then Finance Minister, Senator Nick Minchin.

The proposal was approved, albeit with a small reduction on the original bid. The unit was raised as the Incident Response Regiment on 1 July 2002. Today it continues to serve as the Special Operations Engineer Regiment.

So, 20 years on, what’s my reflection on September 11? It’s all about Newton’s third law of physics.

The most important learning is that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Each threat drives a counterthreat, which in turn drives a new threat response. This is physics, which is just as applicable to the terrorist threat cycle as to experiments in the laboratory.

For instance, in response to weapons of mass effect against large gatherings, we have improved venue security to monitor targeted sites and prevent delivery of payloads. In response to aircraft being used as weapons, we improved aviation security and introduced passenger screening. When there was a shift to using smaller explosive devices delivered by suicide bombers, in Australia we made it more difficult to acquire the materials to produce explosive and toxic devices.

And when vehicles were used as weapons, and where there was potential for a sufficient gathering of pedestrians to cause harm, we introduced bollards and traffic control measures. And when it came to the use of small arms, or where firearms regulation was more rigid, we improved intelligence and counter radicalisation programs. This included intercepting travellers before they could become foreign fighters.

The cyber threat

Now as nations and criminals engage in conflict, the arena is shifting from the physical to the cyber world. This transition is creating a proliferation in the use of online forums for recruitment, motivation and planning. Online activism is morphing into cyber attacks against governments and institutions, often following the methods used by cyber criminals.

But more on this to come in another article…

Key takeaways

  • Be prepared: I am a great believer in Louis Pasteur’s: ‘Fortune favours the prepared mind’. In preparing for the 2000 Sydney Olympics, Australia had the nucleus of a capability in place, which we were able to activate and develop appropriately for a September 11 response.
  • Invest in people: their training and development. This enables your teams to be confident and responsive, and capable of developing ideas to meet emerging challenges.
  • Reward supportive leadership at all levels. Faith in expert advisers encourages an environment of investigation and an important contest of ideas. We need this more than ever as our health experts advise us through the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Risk management must balance response. To over-regulate chemical production to manage a terrorist threat for example could have a significant impact on both industry and the economy, which in turn may support a threat group’s initial objectives.
  • Threats are neither unidimensional nor constant. They require an integrated security response that considers people, information, systems and assets. For example, physical security measures to counter a physical threat can be rendered useless by a cyber-attack that disables a facility’s access controls, or allows the recruitment of a threat actor into the organisation.

[i] Craig was recognised for this work with the Conspicuous Service Cross.

[ii] The then Minister Senator Robert Hill, was in Perth welcoming back the first Special Air Service Regiment rotation from Afghanistan.